l e t t e r s
Most sequenced genomes are currently stored in strict access-controlled repositories [1] [2] [3] . Free access to these data could improve the power of genome-wide association studies (GWAS) to identify disease-causing genetic variants and aid the discovery of new drug targets 4, 5 . However, concerns over genetic data privacy [6] [7] [8] [9] may deter individuals from contributing their genomes to scientific studies 10 and could prevent researchers from sharing data with the scientific community 11 . Although cryptographic techniques for secure data analysis exist [12] [13] [14] , none scales to computationally intensive analyses, such as GWAS. Here we describe a protocol for large-scale genome-wide analysis that facilitates quality control and population stratification correction in 9K, 13K, and 23K individuals while maintaining the confidentiality of underlying genotypes and phenotypes. We show the protocol could feasibly scale to a million individuals. This approach may help to make currently restricted data available to the scientific community and could potentially enable secure genome crowdsourcing, allowing individuals to contribute their genomes to a study without compromising their privacy.
GWAS aim to identify genetic variants that are statistically correlated with phenotypes of interest (e.g., disease). Analyzing large numbers of individuals is critical for detecting weak, yet important, genetic signals, such as rare variants or those with small effect sizes 4, 5 . However, privacy concerns [6] [7] [8] [9] have stymied these large-scale studies by discouraging individuals and institutions from sharing their genomes 10, 11 and necessitating strict access-control policies for the amassed data sets, which limit their utility.
Modern cryptography could potentially enable what we refer to as 'secure genome crowdsourcing' , where the input data for population-based studies like GWAS are massively pooled from private individuals or individual entities while hiding the sensitive information (i.e., genotypes and phenotypes) from any entity other than the original data owners. For example, secure multiparty computation (MPC) frameworks 12 enable researchers to collaboratively perform analyses over securely shared data without having direct access to the underlying input. The confidentiality of input data guaranteed by such frameworks would greatly encourage genomic data sharing. Moreover, unlike the current practice of entrusting a single entity (e.g., a biobank [1] [2] [3] ) with the raw data, a breach or corruption of a single party-an increasingly probable event in an era where companies' sensitive user data are routinely leaked in bulk-no longer compromises the privacy of study participants. However, existing proposals for securely performing GWAS based on cryptographic tools like MPC [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] are too limited to enable secure genome crowdsourcing in practice; they either consider vastly simplified versions of the task or require infeasible amounts of computational resources for data sets with a large number of individuals (e.g., many years of computation or petabytes of data). For example, recent work by Jagadeesh et al. 22 , which introduces privacy-preserving rare-variant analysis based on a type of MPC technique known as garbled circuits 14 , is limited to simple Boolean operations and is not applicable to large-scale GWAS, as noted in their work.
A major computational bottleneck for secure GWAS is identifying, and correcting for, population structure, which can cause spurious associations that reflect interpopulation differences, rather than a true biological signal 23 . A widely used procedure for accounting for such confounding is to use principal component analysis (PCA) to capture broad patterns of genetic variation in the data 24 . The top principal components, which are thought to be representative of population-level differences among individuals, are included as covariates in the subsequent association tests to correct for bias. However, performing PCA on very large matrices is challenging for secure computation and, to our knowledge, has not been successfully addressed. This barrier is mainly due to the iterative nature of PCA, which greatly increases the communication cost and overall complexity of the computation. In addition, PCA requires computing over fractional values with sufficient precision. This introduces non-trivial overhead to most existing cryptographic frameworks, which are inherently restricted to integer operations. Supporting computations over fractional values not only increases the size of the data representation, but also increases the complexity of the basic underlying operations, such as multiplication and division.
Here, we present the first secure, practically feasible MPC protocol for GWAS that includes both quality control and population stratification correction (Online Methods and Fig. 1 ). Our protocol has two types of entities: study participants (SPs) and computing parties (CPs). SPs refer to private individuals, institutions, or intermediary data custodians that own the genomes and phenotypes to be secure genome-wide association analysis using multiparty computation Hyunghoon Cho 1 , David J Wu 2 & Bonnie Berger 1,3 l e t t e r s collectively analyzed for the study. CPs consist of three independent parties with appropriate computing resources (CP 0 , CP 1 , and CP 2 ) that cooperatively carry out the GWAS computation. We envision academic research groups, consortia, or relevant government agencies (e.g., the US National Institutes of Health (NIH)) to have these roles. At the beginning of our protocol, each SP securely shares their data with CP 1 and CP 2 using a cryptographic technique called "secret sharing" 25 . Next, CP 1 and CP 2 jointly execute an interactive protocol to perform GWAS over these secretly shared data without learning any information about the underlying data. During this step, precomputed values from CP 0 , which are independent of the data from the SPs, are used to greatly speed up the process. Importantly, CP 0 does not see the input and is involved only during preprocessing. Lastly, CP 1 and CP 2 combine their results to reveal the final GWAS statistics and publish them. A complete protocol description is provided in Supplementary Notes 1-9 .
Notably, the total communication complexity of our protocol (i.e., the total amount of data transferred between the CPs) scales linearly in the number of individuals (n) and the number of variants (m) for both the precomputation and the main computation phases after initial data sharing (Supplementary Note 9). In contrast, directly applying state-of-the-art MPC frameworks 26-28 leads to quadratic complexity with large multiplicative constants, which is vastly impractical when both n and m are close to a million. This is primarily because existing frameworks strictly adhere to a modular execution of the computation purely expressed in terms of elementary additions and multiplications.
We introduce several key technical tools that overcome these limitations and improve the efficiency of existing approaches. First, we generalize a core MPC technique known as 'Beaver multiplication triples' , which was initially developed for secure multiplication, to efficiently evaluate arithmetic circuits (Supplementary Note 3) . Our generalized method enables efficient protocols not only for matrix multiplication, but also for exponentiation and iterative algorithms with extensive data reuse patterns, all of which feature prominently in secure GWAS. Second, we employ cryptographic pseudorandom generators (PRGs) to greatly reduce the overall communication cost (Supplementary Note 7) ; when a CP needs to obtain a sequence of random numbers sampled by another CP, which constitutes a significant portion of our protocol, both parties simply derive the numbers from the shared PRG non-interactively. Third, we leverage random projection techniques 29 , which have been shown to be effective for other genomic analyses 30 , to reduce the task of performing PCA on the large genotype matrix (in population stratification analysis) to factoring a small constant-sized matrix (Supplementary Note 9) . Lastly, we restructure the GWAS computation such that each intermediate result (which requires the CPs to communicate a message of the same size) scales linearly with the input dimensions (n and m) (Supplementary Note 9) .
We applied our secure GWAS protocol to three GWAS data sets accessed through the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) dbGaP: a lung cancer data set (n = 9,178), a bladder cancer data set (n = 13,060), and an age-related macular degeneration (AMD) data set (n = 22,683). With the goal of emulating standard GWAS pipelines, we incorporated common quality control filters for genotype missing rate, heterozygosity rate, minor allele frequency, and departure from the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. Following the original studies, we also corrected for population stratification using the top principal components. Note that all our operations were performed securely without revealing any of the underlying data to the CPs; only the individual data providers (i.e., SPs) had access to their own raw data.
Our secure GWAS protocol accurately recapitulates the ground truth association scores we obtained based on the plaintext data ( Supplementary Fig. 1 ). Moreover, our top results ( Table 1) closely matched what was presented in the original publications, despite our limited access to the original data sets and minor differences in the analysis. For example, our secure analysis of the lung cancer data identified the two strongest associations, rs2736100 (Bonferroni-adjusted P-value = 7.99 × 10 −20 ) and rs7086803 (adjusted P = 6.16 × 10 −12 ), which were also the top two findings in the original study. The thirdstrongest (non-redundant) association rs4600802 (Supplementary Table 1 ) was also previously implicated for lung cancer in a published GWAS 31 . For the AMD data set, we securely identified 262 significantly associated loci (adjusted P < 0.001), all of which were located in 9 of the 34 AMD-associated regions that were previously reported in the original study. Our results for bladder cancer were not as consistent as those above with the prior report (although they were still accurate), which we attribute to the fact that only two-thirds of the original data set were available. Nevertheless, our top association for bladder cancer, rs4862110 (adjusted P = 8.79 × 10 −29 ), has been previously implicated in Wegener's granulomatosis 32 , which is reported to increase the risk for bladder cancer 33 . Overall, our results demonstrate the accuracy of our secure GWAS protocol in realistic scenarios.
In addition to obtaining accurate association statistics, our secure GWAS protocol achieved a practical runtime of under 3 d for all three data sets (Fig. 2) . To assess the scalability of our framework, we measured several key metrics, which included runtime, communication bandwidth, the size of the precomputed data, and the size of the initial data sharing. Our metrics showed a clear linear dependence on the number of individuals in the data set, even for up to 100K individuals (Fig. 2) . Through extrapolation, we show that our approach requires 80 d of computation for a data set with a million individuals and 500K single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which is well within the Figure 1 Overview of our secure GWAS pipeline. Study participants (private individuals or institutes) secretly share their genotypes and phenotypes with computing parties (research groups or government agencies), denoted CP 1 and CP 2 , who jointly carry out our secure GWAS protocol to obtain association statistics without revealing the underlying data to any party involved. An auxiliary computing party (CP 0 ) performs input-independent precomputation to greatly speed up the main computation. l e t t e r s practical realm. Further improvements are possible using parallel computation. As a point of reference, the average access request processing time for controlled-access genomic data by the NIH Data Access Committee was 80 d in 2009-2010, although this was claimed to be reduced to 14 d in 2016 (https://osp.od.nih.gov/scientific-sharing/). Note that secure GWAS obviates the need for such an access control procedure as the data remain private throughout the study.
Other metrics also demonstrate reasonable scaling; for a million individuals and 500K SNPs, the size of the initial data sharing was 36 TB (~40 MB data upload for each SP), a total of 435 GB of precomputed data were transferred from CP 0 to CP 1 or CP 2 , and the total communication between CP 1 and CP 2 during the main computation was 306 GB. Our experiments were performed with co-located servers, which have low network latencies. Yet, even with a coast-to-coast setup in the United States (with an approximate transfer rate of 5 MB per second), the expected increase in runtime is at most a day, owing to the fact that the total communication in our protocol is relatively small. Furthermore, if the CPs wish to use a commercial cloud computing platform like Amazon EC2 for executing our protocol, the estimated monetary cost for a million-individual GWAS is a few thousand US dollars, even when the CPs are located on opposite coasts of the United States.
Our protocol is secure in the standard semi-honest (honest-butcurious) security model, where all parties are assumed to faithfully follow the prescribed protocol, but are free to inspect and analyze any portion of the data they observe to gain additional information about the underlying private input. Under this model, our GWAS protocol guarantees that the CPs do not learn any information about the raw genotypes or phenotypes other than what can be inferred from the published results, which include association statistics and the quality control output. We additionally require that the CPs do not collude with one another because they can reconstruct the input by combining their individual shares. We emphasize that this is already a substantial improvement over the current paradigm of entrusting a single entity to handle the raw data.
Notably, our framework can be extended in several different ways to achieve even stronger security guarantees (Supplementary Note 10) . First, in the online phase of the GWAS computation, we can relax the nocollusion requirement by introducing additional CPs. If CP 0 and at least one other CP are honest and do not collude with other parties, security holds even if all of the other parties collude. Note that CP 0 is needed only during precomputation and never handles the private inputs provided by the study participants. Introducing additional CPs for the online phase does not substantially increase the total computation time because the parties perform their local computations concurrently. On the other hand, the total communication increases linearly in the number of parties. Based on our benchmarks, the network communication is only a small fraction of the overall runtime, so we believe that this is unlikely to notably reduce the scalability of our protocol. Next, if we require security against malicious parties (who may deviate from the protocol description) during the online computation, we can take the approach of the SPDZ protocol 27 and include a message authentication code (MAC) with each message. At the end of the protocol Our secure GWAS protocol accurately identifies SNPs with significant disease associations while protecting privacy. We securely performed GWAS on published data sets for lung cancer (n = 9,098 after quality control), bladder cancer (n = 10,678), and AMD (n = 20,679). Top two significant associations for each disease identified by our protocol are shown (disregarding redundant nearby hits). Ground truth association statistics are calculated based on the plaintext data. P-values are obtained via the Cochran-Armitage trend test (one-sided) and adjusted for multiple testing via Bonferroni correction. rs11245742 is in an intergenic region and could not be assigned to a gene. For AMD, P-values were smaller than machine precision and thus could not be precisely determined. Our protocol infers biologically meaningful discoveries from GWAS data sets without compromising the privacy of the underlying data. We additionally provide the top 20 associations for each data set in Supplementary Tables 1-3 . Figure 2 Our secure GWAS protocol achieves practical runtimes, and all of our scalability metrics follow a linear trend. We quantified runtime, communication bandwidth, the size of the precomputed data, and the size of the initial data sharing for the lung cancer, bladder cancer, and AMD data sets, as well as simulated data sets of varying sizes obtained by subsampling the lung cancer data set (for 2K and 5K individuals) or duplicating the AMD data set (for 50K and 100K individuals). Since the number of SNPs differ between the data sets, we normalized all measurements to 500K SNPs for comparison, assuming a linear dependence on the number of SNPs. Lines show the best linear fit for each group. Note that the observed linear trends are not perfect due to the fraction of individuals or SNPs passing quality control being different across different data sets. Overall, our protocol achieves practical runtimes, and all of our performance measures scale linearly with the number of individuals. Phase 1: Quality control procedure. Phase 2: Population stratification analysis (PCA). Phase 3: Association tests. l e t t e r s execution, the MAC is verified to ensure that each step of the online computation was performed according to the protocol specification. This approach roughly doubles both the total computation and communication of the protocol, but provides security against malicious CPs. We expect practitioners to decide the precise tradeoff between security and performance based on the specific details of the study.
Alternative cryptographic frameworks for secure computation, such as homomorphic encryption 13 or garbled circuits 14 , currently impose an overwhelming computational burden-many years of computation or petabytes of communication at the scale of a million genomes (Supplementary Note 11) -and are therefore not viable for largescale GWAS. Solutions based on trusted hardware (e.g., Intel Software Guard Extensions) provide another alternative to using cryptographic tools. However, this technology is still in its infancy and susceptible to numerous side-channel attacks 34,35 (e.g., cache timing attacks, pagefault attacks, branch shadowing attacks) that limit its effectiveness for large-scale, privacy-sensitive computations, such as GWAS. A major advantage of our cryptographic approach is that it provides security guarantees without relying on additional trust assumptions about any particular computing platform or hardware vendor.
Although in this work we focused primarily on a common GWAS setup based on Cochran-Armitage trend tests, our contributions readily generalize to other statistical analyses. In particular, we can extend our framework to support logistic regression analysis for assessing the effect size (odds ratio) of a SNP in case-control studies (Supplementary  Note 12) . A significant challenge in performing logistic regression is the need for iterative numeric optimization methods, which greatly increase the computational overhead of the secure computation. While our current techniques do not yield a practical runtime for a genomewide application of logistic regression, our methods do achieve a secure and practical protocol if we restrict our attention to computing the odds ratios for a few hundred SNPs (Supplementary Fig. 2 ). This suggests an alternative two-step approach that may suffice for many real scenarios. In the first step, our main GWAS protocol (based on Cochran-Armitage) is used to identify a small number of significantly associated SNPs, and then, in the second step, logistic regression is applied to compute their odds ratios.
Our work is complementary to existing literature on differential privacy techniques in biomedicine 36,37 , whose aim is to control the privacy leak in the published results of a study. While the amount of sensitive information revealed by GWAS results will become increasingly smaller as the size of the GWAS data sets grow to a million genomes and beyond, it is worth noting that any existing differential privacy mechanism, such as controlled perturbation of output, can be used in conjunction with our protocol as a post-processing step.
Given the ever-increasing cost-effectiveness and commercialization of genome sequencing, we are entering the age where individuals may take ownership of their own personal genomes, and institutions and hospitals may build their own private genomic databases. Our work provides a blueprint for how modern cryptographic techniques can be used to securely analyze the unprecedented amounts of genomic data being generated and to prevent privacy concerns from negatively affecting scientific discovery.
MeTHodS
Methods, including statements of data availability and any associated accession codes and references, are available in the online version of the paper. Secure multiparty computation review. Multiparty computation (MPC) techniques based on secret sharing 12 enable indirect, privacy-preserving computation over the hidden input. For example, secure addition of two secretly shared numbers x and y can be performed by having both Alice and Bob add their individual shares for x and y. The new shares represent a secret sharing of x + y, which is the desired computation result. Secure building block protocols for more complicated operations (e.g., multiplication, division) are similarly defined, albeit with more advanced techniques that require certain messages (a sequence of numbers) to be exchanged between Alice and Bob. By composing these protocols, arbitrary computation over the private input-even GWAS-can be carried out while keeping the input data private throughout.
Our MPC techniques for scaling secure GWAS. The key technical hurdle in applying secure MPC in practice has been its lack of scalability. The cost of communication between Alice and Bob quickly becomes impractical as the size of the input data grows and the desired computation becomes more complex. In particular, principal component analysis (PCA) is a standard procedure for GWAS that incurs an overwhelming communication burden for a large input matrix (e.g., a million in each dimension). To achieve a scalable MPC protocol for GWAS, we introduce various techniques, including improved MPC building blocks that minimize redundant computation (Supplementary Note 3) , compression of messages via pseudorandom generators (Supplementary Note 7) , and more efficient protocol design for GWAS (Supplementary Note 9) . The resulting framework scales secure GWAS to a million genomes. Formal descriptions of secret-sharing-based MPC as well as our techniques for achieving scalability are provided in Supplementary Notes 1-9.
Data preprocessing. For the lung cancer data set, the combined data across seven study groups consisted of 612,794 autosomal SNPs over 9,178 individuals (5,088 cases and 4,090 controls). The study cohort was divided into five age groups: <40, 40-50, 50-60, 60-70, and >70. We used binary membership vectors for age and study group as additional covariates for the association tests (ten linearly independent features). To generate smaller data sets for scalability analysis, we randomly subsampled the individuals to obtain data sets with 2K and 5K individuals. For the bladder cancer data set, we combined the intersecting SNPs from two releases (phg000132.v2 and phg000532. v1) to obtain a data set of 566,620 autosomal SNPs over 13,060 individuals (6,211 cases and 6,849 controls). A total of 14 linearly independent covariates included the membership to six study groups, nine age groups, and sex. For the AMD data set, we obtained the portion of data approved for general research use and classified individuals with geographic atrophy (GA), choroidal neovascularization (CNV), or mixed GA/CNV as case subjects and excluded intermediate AMD patients from the analysis, following the original analysis. This resulted in a data set of 508,740 autosomal SNPs over 22,683 individuals (9,648 cases and 13,035 controls). We used data source (blood or cell culture) and membership to ten age groups as covariate information (ten linearly independent features).
GWAS details.
Following the original lung cancer study 38 , we incorporated the following filters for quality control: genotype missing rate per individual <0.05 and per SNP <0.1, individual heterozygosity rate >0.25 and <0.30, minor allele frequency >0.1, and Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium test chi-squared statistic <28.3740 (P-value < 10 −7 ). We used the same set of filters for the bladder cancer and AMD data sets except for the heterozygosity filter, which we excluded due to the distribution of heterozygosity rates being considerably different in these data sets. After quality control, our data consisted of 9,098 individuals and 378,492 SNPs for lung cancer, 10,678 individuals and 389,868 SNPs for bladder cancer, and 20,679 individuals and 221,295 SNPs for AMD.
For population stratification analysis, we chose a subset of SNPs with low levels of linkage disequilibrium by imposing a minimum pairwise distance threshold of 100 Kb, which resulted in 23,724 loci for lung cancer data, 23,894 loci for bladder cancer data, and 22,866 loci for AMD data. Genomic positions of the SNPs in the data are considered public, since they do not contain any private information. Therefore, this filtering step is performed in plaintext. The genotypes of each SNP are standardized before PCA is performed using the same approach as previous work 24 . We perform this standardization indirectly (i.e., computation results are adjusted after the fact) in order to avoid the size of precomputed data being quadratic in the genotype matrix dimensions (Supplementary Note 9) . We kept the top five principal components for the subsequent analysis.
We used the Cochran-Armitage trend test (one-sided) to assess the association between each SNP and the disease status. In the presence of covariates (e.g., top principal components and age/study group memberships), the desired test statistic is equivalent to the squared Pearson correlation coefficient between the genotype and phenotype vectors, where the subspace defined by the covariates is projected out from both vectors before computing the correlation. The resulting correlations are revealed as the final output of our secure protocol along with the quality control results. Note that the mapping between test statistics and statistical significance (P-values) does not reveal any additional information about the input and thus is performed in plaintext.
Scalability metrics.
To assess the scalability of our protocol, we measured the following four quantities in our experiments: runtime, communication bandwidth, the size of the precomputed data, and the size of the initial data sharing. The runtime measurements capture just the main computation phase after the initial data sharing phase. This is because the initial transfer is heavily dependent upon the study setup (given the distributed nature of data ownership). While in practice CP 0 would perform the precomputation before the online computation, we allowed CP 0 to compute and send precomputed values onthe-fly to simplify our experimental setup. Therefore, our reported runtimes also include the precomputation costs, which are small compared to the main computation. We also give the total size of the initial data, which consists of a genotype vector, disease status, and covariate phenotypes collected from each study participant. Initial data sharing includes: (i) distributed data transfer from each SP to CP 1 or CP 2 and (ii) an equal-sized data exchange between CP 1 and CP 2 (Supplementary Note 9) . Since the exchange between CP 1 and CP 2 during this procedure can be coalesced into a single batch transfer, we note that physically shipping hard drives can serve as an alternative to online data transfer at the scale of tens of terabytes (when working with millions of genomes). Next, communication bandwidth refers to the total amount of data exchanged between CP 1 and CP 2 during the main computation phase. Finally, the size of the precomputed data refers to the amount of data transferred from CP 0 to either CP 1 or CP 2 during the precomputation phase.
Hardware environment for benchmark experiments. The hardware systems used for our experiments are as follows: • CP 1 : 3.47 GHz Intel Xeon X5690 CPU with 176 GB RAM • CP 2 : 3.33 GHz Intel Xeon X5680 CPU with 96 GB RAM • CP 0 and SP: 3.47 GHz Intel Xeon X5690 CPU with 48 GB RAM Since SP only participates in the initial data transfer, the same server could be used for both parties for benchmarking purposes. Our memory usage was well below the full capacity (tens of GBs) and is expected to remain similar for larger data sets, as our protocol loads only a small number of individuals' data into memory at a time in a streaming fashion. The required storage capacity of our protocol is determined by the size of initial data sharing; our CPs had access to a storage unit with >50 TB of space, which is notably sufficient for even a million-individual data set. All three servers were co-located with an average communication speed of 106 MB per second. The impact of using a long-distance setup is discussed in the main text. We used the threadboosting feature of the number theory package NTL with 20 cores on each machine, which is used only for speeding up large matrix multiplications in our computation.
Estimating monetary cost for cloud computing services. We estimated the monetary cost of running our protocol on Amazon EC2 using AWS Simple Monthly Calculator (https://calculator.s3.amazonaws.com/index.html). Requesting two "c4.4xlarge" instances (16 cores with 30 GB memory) on USEast (Virginia) and US-West-2 (Oregon) with 125 GB/month inter-region data transfer costs $3,900 total for 3 months (accessed 12/02/2017) and is sufficient for a million-individual GWAS. Even the initial data transfer of 36 TB between CP 1 and CP 2 , which may be better carried out by physically shipping hard drives, increases the cost by only $800. We chose our benchmark GWAS data sets from the dbGaP repository such that their sample sizes are representative of large-scale GWAS. In order to demonstrate the scalability of our method to sample sizes larger than what was available to us, we simulated larger data sets containing up to 100K individuals, which provided us enough data to support our extrapolation to 1 million individuals.
Data exclusions
Describe any data exclusions. Our quality control filters include: genotype missing rate per individual < 0.05 and per SNP < 0.1, individual heterozygosity rate > 0.25 and < 0.30, minor allele frequency > 0.1, and Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium test chi-squared statistic < 28.3740 (p-value < 10E-7). We excluded the heterozygosity filter for the bladder cancer and AMD data sets due to the distribution of heterozygosity rates being considerably different in these data sets.
Replication
Describe whether the experimental findings were reliably reproduced.
Our computational experiments can be reliably reproduced based on the code we provide.
Randomization
Describe how samples/organisms/participants were allocated into experimental groups.
There were no group allocations in this study.
Blinding
Describe whether the investigators were blinded to group allocation during data collection and/or analysis.
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Statistical parameters
For all figures and tables that use statistical methods, confirm that the following items are present in relevant figure legends (or in the Methods section if additional space is needed).
n/a Confirmed
The exact sample size (n) for each experimental group/condition, given as a discrete number and unit of measurement (animals, litters, cultures, etc.)
A description of how samples were collected, noting whether measurements were taken from distinct samples or whether the same sample was measured repeatedly A statement indicating how many times each experiment was replicated
The statistical test(s) used and whether they are one-or two-sided (note: only common tests should be described solely by name; more complex techniques should be described in the Methods section)
A description of any assumptions or corrections, such as an adjustment for multiple comparisons
The test results (e.g. P values) given as exact values whenever possible and with confidence intervals noted A clear description of statistics including central tendency (e.g. median, mean) and variation (e.g. standard deviation, interquartile range)
Clearly defined error bars
See the web collection on statistics for biologists for further resources and guidance.
Software
Policy information about availability of computer code
Describe the software used to analyze the data in this study.
We provide a link to the C++ implementation of our method (secure GWAS protocol), which we used to obtain the results presented in our study. Our code is also provided as Supplementary Code.
For manuscripts utilizing custom algorithms or software that are central to the paper but not yet described in the published literature, software must be made available to editors and reviewers upon request. We strongly encourage code deposition in a community repository (e.g. GitHub). Nature Methods guidance for providing algorithms and software for publication provides further information on this topic.
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